Autodesk 3ds Max Design 2015 Crack and Keygen incl

Look Inside Get Access

Find out how to access preview-only content


Network and System Security

Volume 8792 of the series Lecture Notes in Computer Science pp 435-447

Buy this eBook

Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access

Recently, extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol, proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin, is considered to be one of the stronger security models that covers many attacks on existing models. Unfortunately, it does not capture the very sensitive security barricades, the Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and the Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (MPFS) in ID-based setting. An ID-based AKE protocol with PFS (resp. MPFS) ensures that the revealing of static keys of the parties (resp. the master secret key of the private key generator), must not compromise even a single bit of the session keys of the past sessions between the parties. In the current status, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocol with either PFS or MPFS. Proposed here, are the ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols with PFS and MPFS in the random oracle model. Towards achieving this goal, we also construct ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols, one without Master Forward Secrecy (MFS) and the remaining one with MFS, almost at the same computational cost as the existing efficient ID-based eCK Secure Single Round AKE protocols. All of our protocols are secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem.


Authenticated Key Exchange ID-based cryptography eCK-secure perfect forward secrecy

Continue reading...

To view the rest of this content please follow the download PDF link above.

GRC Ultra High Security Password Generator - m
Efficient hierarchical identity based signature scheme in the
ECK Secure Single Round ID-Based Authenticated Key Exchange
Java security: Java security, Part 1: Crypto basics - IBM
Identity-Based Encryption - Applied Cryptography Group